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Abstract
High availability is no longer just a business continuity concern. Users are
increasingly dependant on devices that consume and produce data in ever in-
creasing volumes. A popular solution is to have a central repository which each
device accesses after centrally managed authentication. This model of use is fa-
cilitated by cloud based file synchronisation services such as Dropbox, OneDrive,
Google Drive and Apple iCloud. Cloud architecture allows the provisioning of
storage space with “always-on” access. Recent concerns over unauthorised access
to third party systems and large scale exposure of private data have made an al-
ternative solution desirable. These events have caused users to assess their own
security practices and the level of trust placed in third party storage services.
One option is BitTorrent Sync, a cloudless synchronisation utility provides data
availability and redundancy. This utility replicates files stored in shares to re-
mote peers with access controlled by keys and permissions. While lacking the
economies brought about by scale, complete control over data access has made
this a popular solution. The ability to replicate data without oversight intro-
duces risk of abuse by users as well as difficulties for forensic investigators. This
paper suggests a methodology for investigation and analysis of the protocol to
assist in the control of data flow across security perimeters.
Keywords: BitTorrent Sync, Distributed Storage, Peer-to-Peer, Network
Traffic Analysis, Remote Evidence Acquisition
Preprint submitted to Computers and Security September 17, 2018
ar
X
iv
:1
50
6.
01
41
4v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  3
 Ju
n 2
01
5
1. Introduction
Applications such as Evernote and Dropbox leverage the decreasing cost of
hard disk storage seen in Infrastructure as a Service providers, e.g., Amazon S3,
to provide data storage on the cloud to home users and businesses alike. The
main advantage of services such as Dropbox, Google Drive, Microsoft OneDrive
(formally SkyDrive) and Apple iCloud to the end user is that their data is stored
in a virtual extension of their local machine with no direct user interaction
required after installation. It is also backed up by a fully distributed data-
centre architecture that would be completely outside the financial reach of the
average consumer. Their data is available anywhere with Internet access and is
usually machine agnostic so the same data can be accessed on multiple devices
without any need to re-format partitions or wasting space by creating multiple
copies of the same file for each device. Some services such as Dropbox, also have
offline client applications that allow for synchronisation of data to a local folder
for offline access.
As Internet accessibility continues to become more commonplace and allows
for increasingly faster access, it is not unexpected that many utilities that are in-
tended for general use will aid in the perpetration of some variety of cybercrime.
One attribute that is highly desirable by those contemplating illegal activities
is the notion of anonymity and data security – especially the ability to keep
data secure transfer secure from inspection while in transit. BitTorrent Sync
(also referred to as BTSync, BitSync and bsync) is a file replication utility that
would seem to serve exactly this function for the user. Designed to be server
agnostic, the protocol is built on already popular and widespread technologies
that would not seem out of place in any network activity log.
Each of the aforementioned consumer focused services can be categorised as
cloud synchronisation services. This means that while the data is synchronised
between user machines, a copy of the data is also stored remotely in the cloud.
In recent headline news, much of this data is easily available to governmental
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agencies without the need of a warrant or just cause. BTSync provides the same
synchronisation functionality (without the cloud storage aspect) and provides a
similar level of data availability. The service has numerous desirable attributes
for any Internet user [1]:
• Compatibility and Availability – Clients are built for most common desk-
top and mobile operating systems, e.g., Windows, Mac OS, Linux, BSD,
Android and iOS.
• Synchronisation Options – Users can choose whether to sync their content
over a local network or over the Internet to remote machines with no re-
quirement for scripting or schedule management making this an accessible
technology compared to existing options such as RSYNC.
• No Limitations or Cost – Most cloud synchronisation services provide a
free tier offering a small amount of storage and subsequently charge when
the user outgrows the available space. BTSync eliminates these limitations
and costs. The only limitation to the volume of storage and speed of the
service is down to the limitations of the synchronised users machines.
• Automated Backup – Like most competing products, once the initial in-
stall and configuration is complete, the data contained within specified
folders is automatically synchronised between machines.
• Decentralised Technology – All data transmission and synchronisation
takes place solely in a Peer-to-Peer (P2P) fashion, based on the BitTorrent
file sharing protocol.
• Encrypted Data Transmission – While synchronising data between com-
puters, the data is encrypted using RSA encryption. Under the BTSync
API, developers can also enable remote file storage encryption [2]. – This
could result in users storing their data on untrusted remote locations for
the purposes of data redundancy and secure off site backup.
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• Proprietary Technology The precise protocol and operation of the tech-
nology is not documented by the developer. There is debate over whether
security through obscurity or peer code evaluation, i.e., open source, is
better. Some enterprise security policies prohibit the use of open source
applications as a result of the source code being open to inspection by
those looking for flaws in the implementation. From the point of view of
the consumer, BitTorrent Inc. have stated that they will not give access
to traffic to any LEA without due process and the bespoke protocol makes
casual eavesdropping or crawling less likely.
As a result of these attributes, BTSync has grown to become a popular al-
ternative to cloud based synchronisation services. Less than a year after its
release, the active user base had grown to over one million by November 2013,
doubling to two million by December 2013 [3], and to over ten million users
by August 2014 [4]. Due to this rapid growth and popularity the service will
undoubtedly be of interest to both law enforcement officers and digital forensics
investigators in future investigations. Like many other file distribution tech-
nologies, this interest may be centred around recovery of the data itself, proof
of the modification of data or evidence of data distribution and enumeration of
the recipients.
While BTSync is based on the same technology as BitTorrent for the transfer
of files, the intention of the application is quite different. This results in a
change of users’ behaviours, as well as a necessary change in the assumptions
an investigator should make. BitTorrent is designed to be a one-to-many data
dissemination utility. The uploader usually does not care about the identity
of the downloader and a single seeder can deliver data to a large number of
unique peers over the life of the torrent file. Data integrity and transfer speed
take precedence over privacy of data in transit. BTSync on the other hand, is
designed to be a secure data replication protocol for making a faithful replica
of a data set on a remote machine. Data integrity is still highly prised but
data privacy is now the top priority and speed-through-dispersion is sacrificed
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as a result. The files can only be read by users specifically given access to
the repository. The advertisement of data availability is completely scalable by
the owner with options ranging from restricting access to known IP addresses
through to registration with a centralised tracker. Given the nature of the
application, users are much more likely to know the operator of the remote site
(this does not apply to secrets advertised online though that could be a point
of commonality that would not necessarily have existed for pure BitTorrent
clients).
1.1. Aim and Contribution of this Work
The aim of this work is to provide a reference for digital investigators dis-
covering the use of BitTorrent Sync in an active investigation. However, it is
hoped that the analysis presented may be of use to security personnel looking
to detect and control the use of this protocol within their perimeter.
To accommodate these goals this work presents an analysis of the protocol
and its network interaction. Activities undertaken to perform a synchronisation
are presented and described at the packet level in order to facilitate both post
mortem traffic analysis and to enable the development of feature based detec-
tion rules and deep packet inspection for Network Intrusion Detection Systems
(NIDS) or firewall appliances.
The contribution of this work presents a suggested a network investigation
methodology for BitTorrent Sync, outlined in Section 5. This methodology
includes recommendations for the investigation of a number of hypothetical
scenarios where BTSync could be used to aid in criminal or illicit activities.
Legitimate usage of the system, e.g., backup and synchronisation, group mod-
ification, data transfer between systems, etc., may itself be of interest to an
investigation. However, the technology may also be suitable in the aid of a
number of potential scenarios of interest such as industrial espionage, copyright
infringement, sharing of illicit images of children, etc., outlined in greater detail
in Section 2.3. This work also documents each of the observed packets sent and
received during regular operation of BTSync. Finally, the results from two dig-
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ital forensic investigations of the service are outlined in Section 6 and Section 7
respectively.
2. Background
In order to gain an understanding of how BTSync functions, one must first
understand the technologies upon which it is built. The application is a prod-
uct built by BitTorrent Inc. (the creators and maintainers of the eponymous
file-sharing protocol). As a result, the technologies used by the regular BitTor-
rent protocol and BTSync are developed using a similar premise. This section
provides a brief overview of the required background information and outlined
the key differences between the two applications.
2.1. BitTorrent File Sharing Protocol
The BitTorrent protocol is designed to easily facilitate the distribution of
files to a large number of downloaders with minimal load on the original file
source [5]. This is achieved through the downloaders uploading their completed
parts of the entire file to other downloaders. A BitTorrent swarm is made up of
both seeders (peers with complete copies of the content shared in the swarm),
and leechers (peers who are downloading the content and may have none or
some of the content). Due to BitTorrent’s ease of use and minimal bandwidth
requirements, it lends itself as an ideal platform for the unauthorised distribution
of copyrighted material. The unauthorised distribution of copyrighted material
typically commences with a single original source sharing large sized files to
many downloaders.
2.1.1. Bencoding
Bencoding is a method of notation for storing data in an array list. The
main advantage of bencoding is that it avoids the pitfalls of system-byte order
requirements (such as big-endian or little-endian), which can cause issues for
cross platform communication between applications. The datagram packet can
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Table 1: BTSync Packet Bencoding Fields
Key Explanation
d: Marks the start of a dictionary
l: List start, the start of a list of field:value pairs
in an array. Lists are terminated with an “e”
la: local Address IP:Port in Network-Byte Order
ea: External Address IP:Port in Network-Byte Or-
der
m: Message Type Header, e.g., ping
peer: [Peer ID]
share: [Share ID]
nonce: 16-byte nonce for key exchange between peers
negotiating data exchange
e: Marks the end of a dictionary or list
easily be converted to a human readable UTF-8 encoded sequence of key:value
pairs. Indicative key:value pairings are presented in Table 1.
The value for any pair is stored as a sequence of-bytes with the exception of
integer values. Associated with the integer indicating keys, bencoding uses the
lowercase “i” to indicate the start of an integer value, which is also terminated
with a lowercase “e”.
2.1.2. Active Peer Discovery
Each BitTorrent client must be able to identify a list of active peers in the
same swarm who have at least one piece of the content and is willing to share it,
i.e., identify a peer that has an available open connection and has the bandwidth
available to upload. By the nature of the implementation of the protocol, any
peer that wishes to partake in a swarm must be able to communicate and share
files with other active peers. BitTorrent provides a number of methods available
for peer discovery. There are a number of methods that a BitTorrent client can
use in an attempt to discover new peers who are in the swarm outlined below
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1. Tracker Communication – BitTorrent trackers maintain a list of seeders
and leechers for each BitTorrent swarm they are currently supporting [6].
Each BitTorrent client will contact the tracker intermittently throughout
the download of a particular piece of content to report that they are still
alive on the network and to download a short list of new peers on the
network.
2. Peer Exchange (PEX) – As set out in the standard BitTorrent specifica-
tion, there is no intercommunication between peers of different BitTorrent
swarms besides data transmission. Peer Exchange is a BitTorrent En-
hancement Proposal (BEP) whereby when two peers are communicating
(sharing the data referenced by a torrent file), a subset of their respective
peer lists are shared during the communication.
3. Distributed Hash Tables (DHT) – Many BitTorrent clients, such as Vuze
and µTorrent contain implementations of a common distributed hash ta-
ble as part of the standard client features. The common DHT maintains a
list of each active peer using the corresponding clients and enables cross-
swarm communication between peers. Each known peer active in swarms
with DHT contributors is added to the DHT. The mainline BitTorrent
DHT protocol (also used by BTSync), is based on the Kademlia proto-
col. Regular BitTorrent file-sharing users and BTSync users contribute to
the update and maintenance of the DHT. The DHT provides an entirely
decentralised approach aiding in the discovery of new peers sharing par-
ticular pieces of content. The Kademlia DHT structures its ID space as a
tree [7]. The distance between two keys in the ID space is their “exclusive
or” (xor). Each user in the DHT generates a unique key that is used for
identification when connecting to the DHT. The piece of the DHT that
each peer stores is related to this xor calculation. Those peer IDs that
are closest to the key, e.g., a torrent’s info_hash, are responsible for fa-
cilitating lookups for those keys. The same DHT responsible for regular
BitTorrent file-sharing is also responsible for maintaining a lookup for BT-
Sync shared content. In this scenario, the key used is based on the public
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read-only key generated for each shared folder in BTSync.
While a DHTs decentralised nature results in a much more resilient service
compared to server based tracker, it also results in it be vulnerable to
certain attacks, as outlined in greater details in Sit et. al’s 2002 paper [8].
4. Local Peer Discovery (LPD) – This is enabled by checking the “Search
LAN” option in most BitTorrent client’s application preferences. When
enabled the application will announce its availability to potential local
peers using multicast packets. Once a client on the network receives a
multicast packet, that client will check its current list of shares to see if a
match is found. Is a match it found, that peer will respond to the origin
of the request offering to synchronise the content.
2.1.3. Downloading of Content through BitTorrent
To commence the download of the content in a particular BitTorrent swarm,
a metadata .torrent file or a corresponding magnet universal resource identi-
fier (URI) must be acquired from a BitTorrent indexing website. This file/URI
is then opened using a BitTorrent client, which proceeds to identify other active
peers sharing the specific content required. The client application then attempts
to connect to several active members and downloads the content piece by piece.
Each BitTorrent swarm is built around a single piece of content which is deter-
mined through a unique identifier based on a SHA-1 hash of the file information
contained in this UTF-8 encoded metadata file/URI, e.g., name, piece length,
piece hash values, length and path.
2.2. BitTorrent Sync
BTSync is a file replication utility created by BitTorrent Inc. and released
as a private alpha in April 2013 [1]. It is not a cloud backup solution, nor
necessarily intended as any form of off-site storage. Any data transferred using
BTSync resides in whole files on at least one of the synchronised devices. This
makes the detection of data much simpler for digital forensic purposes as there
is no distributed file system, redundant data block algorithms or need to contact
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Figure 1: Keys (formerly secrets) are generated at share provision. The ability to view the
keys is not available in v2.0
a cloud storage provider to get a list of all traffic to or from a container using
discovered credentials. The investigation remains an examination of the local
suspect machine. However, because BTSync uses DHT to transfer data there is
also no central authority to manage authentication or log data access attempts.
A suspect file found on a system may have been downloaded from one or many
sources and may have been uploaded to one or more recipients. Additionally
while the paid services offer up to 1TB of storage (Amazon S3 paid storage
plan), the free versions which are much more popular with home users cap at
approximately 10GB. BTSync is limited only by the size of the folder being
set as a share. Another concern for any investigation into BTSync folders is
that unless the system being examined is the owner/originator of the folder
being shared, it is quite possible that any files present were downloaded without
prior knowledge of their content or nature. Before v2.0, BTSync had no built
in content preview facility in its protocol, it merely blindly synchronises from
host to target without any selection process available to the user. In v2.0, an
option was added to the preferences for each folder that allows the user to only
synchronise file titles as a zero byte place holder file. If the file is selected the
content of the file is downloaded. An update to the link descriptor in v1.4 allows
users to get an approximation of the share size at the time of joining.
2.2.1. Keys
The “secrets” used as part of the original release of BTSync were renamed
as “keys” in v1.4. The structure has not been changed however and still con-
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sists of a 33 character human readable string consisting of a Base32 encoded
string generated when the folder was first provisioned. This Base32 pattern is
then prepended with a single letter indicating its nature. Keys are the unique
identifiers used by the BTSync service to differentiate between shared folders.
In order for the 20-byte keys to be human readable, they are displayed using
Base32 encoding [1]. BTSync facilitates the generation of three categories of
secrets for the sharing of data contained within specific folders, as can be seen
in Figure 1.
The initial Read & Write (RW) key is still generated using CryptoApi on
Windows based systems (this is downloaded as part of the installation process
if it is not installed already). This RW key is the equivalent of the original
“master secret” in that, if it is shared then the receiving party has an equal
level of access to the share as the original owner including the ability to delete
content and add new content that will be replicated to any synchronising peer
whether downstream or of equal rank.
From this initial RW key, a Read Only Key (RO) is generated automatically
for sharing. As can be seen in Figure 1, these are the only two keys readily
available to the user. However, these are not the only keys available for use.
BTSync defines six standard keys of which three can be generated using the
default installation of the desktop client. These keys are identified by their
prepended letter as follows:
• [A] This is the RW key generated at the time the share is provisioned.
This key gives the user full control over the share contents.
• [B] This identifies the Read Only key and can be used to create a child, or
downstream, peer that can only replicate share contents from another peer.
Any changes made to share contents, including deletion, will invalidate the
file changed and prevent any further replication actions for that particular
file in the future, or until the share is re-provisioned on that client (or the
share’s *.db file is altered but this may cause the entire share to be deemed
invalid).
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• [C] The C type key is a read only one-use key that is discarded after its
first use. This key can be generated from either type A or type B keys
and is used primarily in the distribution of other keys.
• [D] Generated through the use of the Sync API, this type of key allows
read & write access to encrypted shares.
• [E] A read only key capable of replicating data from type D encrypted
shares and decrypting the contents. This key is calculated form the type
D key and so is not possible using that standard BTSync v1.4 or v2.0
installation.
• [F] Encrypted Read Only key capable of replicating data from an en-
crypted share but unable to decrypt the share contents. This type of key
can be used to store data in an encrypted state on a remote, untrusted,
system and still provide authenticity and availability.
Older versions of these, such as the ‘R’ prepended read only key of v0.x
are still usable but are no longer generated by the application. As with the
earlier BTSync versions, a user may also generate his or her own key that has
been Base64 encoded. As a result, these default prepended identification letters
cannot always be taken as an definite indicator of the access level granted by a
key before it has been applied.
The Keys outlined above need never necessarily be shared publicly, i.e.,
any user can create a number of keys solely for his personal use across his
different machines. Depending on the level of access the user wishes to give
to a third-party, he can give the corresponding key to any other user through
regular one-to-one communication methods (e-mail, instant messaging, social
networking, SMS, etc.). If public distribution is desirable, there are a number
of public online avenues for BTSync users to share secrets with each other (e.g.
www.btsynckeys.com, http://www.reddit.com/r/btsecrets, among others).
Version 1.4 presents a change to the method of sharing a link with a peer that
has been modified further in v2.0. In v1.4, a user can still view the RW and RO
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Figure 2: Key Sharing is NowManaged from within the Application with Optional Restrictions
key of a share and can copy this key and send it via any medium to the remote
device. Using this method, the remote device user adds a new share and inputs
the key causing the share to automatically query a tracker (if this option is left
enabled) for the location of remote peers hosting a share matching the applied
key. An alternative to this method was added to the client and works as follows:
In the application the user that currently has access to the share (the owner)
can select the option to provision the share to another user (a peer which can
be a different person or a remote system under the control of the owner), as
depicted in Figure 2, and is presented with a choice of restrictions and methods
presented as options.
Permissions
• Read Only (default)
• Read & Write
Security Options
• Invited participants must be approved – the owner will receive notification
in the application that a peer wishes to share the resource. The Device ID
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of the remote peer will be presented and the owner can accept or reject
their membership. This option is enabled by default.
• Expiration date – the link to the share will only remain active for a set
number of days from the time it is generated. This option is enabled by
default and the time limit is set to three days, but can be changed to any
number of days the owner inputs.
• Number of uses – this option allows the owner to limit the number of times
a link can be used to join a share. This is set to off by default.
The link generated by this process is presented as https://link.getsync.com/[URLoptions],
where the URL options are each separated by an ampersand. For example a
link shared from v1.4 for a folder called winhex with no expiry or usage lim-
itation would present as https://link.getsync.com/#f=winhex&sz=35E5&s=
XIQSFD2MCDPS2QKITWKJROJ2VUSV2YNA&i=CKKR3V2BBM7MXIOTPU3XWK55JBUFWG3EY&p=
CALSNMDGCZZAUQXBXEIR6Q57UMTVOSFI&e=1431277452 where:
• #f=(folder name of the share in plain text)
• sz=(approximate size of the share contents)
• s=(the shareID of the folder encoded in Base32)
• i=(a one time key used to provide access to the real key, this changes every
time the link for the folder is generated)
• p=(PeerID of the peer performing the server role in the upcoming key
exchange)
• e=(the expiry timestamp of the link if it is set, if it is not set this item
will not be present in the link)
• v=(the version of the client. This is only present in the v2.0 client and is
not optional)
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Figure 3: A received link can be shortened and still be resolved to a share by the server
This URL can be copied to the system clipboard, sent via email (the email
option will open the default mail application on the system) or converted to a
QR code for scanning by a mobile device.
At a minimum the link must contain the folder, shareID and one time key
fields to resolve to a share if entered directly into a browser however removing
the version may cause the actual replication to fail if the remote version is
incompatible with the version adding the share. An example how this stripped
down link resolves is shown in Figure 3. Once an option is selected, the share
link is converted into a URL that can be opened by the locally installed client
if the client satisfies all of the requirements such as version number.
An alternative to opening the link in a web browser is to enter the link in
the client itself as if it was a share key, as shown in Figure 4. However, if the
version is not correct the replication will fail and, if authorisation is required,
the request will never be sent to the owner.
The process of joining a share has also been changed in v1.4 and v2.0. Us-
ing the x.509 security certificates and public private key pairs stored in the
15
Figure 4: A received link can also be added in the section to manually add a share
Figure 5: Requests for access can be verified (redacted) and share members can be reviewed
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sync.dat file in the BitTorrent Sync folder. Once a host address is retrieved
a connection is made and a request for the RO or RW key is sent using the One-
Time-Key (i in the optional data) along with the peer’s public key generated
the first time a link is received or generated. The user and device name set at
this time will be the user and device name that the owner will see if they check
the identity of the peer requesting access. The device name will also be present
in the device list available for each share as can be seen in Figure 5. Once
authorised, the requesting peer receives a copy of the required key encrypted
with their public key which they then decrypt and apply to the share on their
end of the connection. Once complete the process of synchronisation can begin
and the new peer will be registered on the tracker if that option is left enabled.
2.3. Potential Scenarios Pertinent to Digital Forensic Investigation
2.3.1. Industrial Espionage
Many companies are aware of the dangers of allowing BitTorrent traffic on
their networks. However, quite often corporate IT departments enforce a block-
ing of the technology through protocol blocking rules on their perimeter fire-
walls. This has the effect of cutting off any BitTorrent clients installed on the
LAN from the outside world. In addition to Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) to
investigate the data portion of a network packet passing the inspection point,
basic blocking of known torrent tracker sites using firewall rule sets can be
used. BTSync does use BitTorrent as the protocol for file transfer but once the
transfer session is established using the BTSync protocol all traffic is encrypted
using AES and may not be open to inspection by a firewall. It also does not
follow the current known patterns that would identify an encrypted BitTorrent
stream as the target-source profile is different. Blocking t.usyncapp.com and
r.usyncapp.com will stop the tracker and relay options from being used but
BTSync can operate quite well without those services. Local peer discovery
can use multicast or direct “known peer" configuration where a known IP:Port
combination is used to identify a specific machine allowed to participate in the
share. This specificity would negate the issue of multicast packets usually not
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being routed beyond the current network segment. A scenario where BTSync
can be used to transfer files within a LAN would be to transfer data to a machine
with lower security protocols in place such as the capability to write to a USB
device or perhaps even unmonitored access to the Internet (and the BitTorrent
protocol ) through a designated guest LAN.
2.3.2. Cloudless Backup
By synchronising between two or more machines accessible to the user, data
can be stored in multiple locations as a form of backup. The secondary copies of
a file would be stored using a read only key so that only changes on the primary
system will ever replicated. A feature of BTSync that is enabled by default but
can be disabled in the configuration file, is the use of the .SyncArchive folder
that stores a copy of any file deleted or changed for a preset period of time
allowing for a form of file recovery or versioning.
2.3.3. Encrypted Remote P2P Backup
The BitTorrent Sync API [2] adds the functionality to generate an “encryp-
tion secret”. Through the use of encryption secrets, a BTSync user has the
ability to remotely store encrypted data, e.g., personal, sensitive or illegal, on
one or more remote machines. These remote machines do not have the ability
to decrypt the information stored. The data could then be securely wiped off
the original machine and easily recovered at a later stage.
2.3.4. Dead Drop
Due to BTSync’s intended use as a file replication utility, it is assumed that
a person receiving a copy of a shared directory is aware of the contents of the
folder. As a result, no method was included to gather details of the contents of
a share before synchronisation. The API [2] introduced this function but only
a node configured correctly with an API key will return a folder or file listing
when queried.
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2.3.5. Secure P2P Messaging
For example, the proof of concept found at http://missiv.es/. The ap-
plication currently operates by saving messages to an “outbox” folder that has
a read only key shared to the person you want to receive the message. They in
turn send you a read only key to their outbox. One to many can be achieved by
sharing the read only key with more than one person but no testing has been
done with synchronisation timing issues yet and key management may become
an issue as a new outbox would be needed for each private conversation required.
2.3.6. Piracy
– BitTorrent, like any other P2P technology, was designed for one-to-many
distribution of large content and has become almost synonymous with piracy.
BTSync was not necessarily intended to be a one-to-many distribution utility.
However, it does allow for a group of users to set one another as “known peers”
so that they can communicate directly through encrypted channels. Websites
such as http://btsynckeys.com/ have examples of users posting keys publicly
and advertising the content as being copyrighted material.
2.3.7. Serverless Website Hosting
– This involves the creation of static websites served through a BTSync
shared folder. These websites could be directly viewed on each user’s local ma-
chine. The local copies of the website could receive updates from the webmaster
automatically through the synchronisation of the content associated with a read
only secret.
2.3.8. Malicious Software Distribution
– Due to the lack of any trust level being associated with any publicly shared
secret, the synchronised files may contain infected executables.
For each of the above scenarios, an added dimension can be created by the
BTSync user: time. Due to the ability to create “throw away” or temporary
secrets for any piece of content, the timeframe where evidence may be recovered
from remote sharing peers might be very short.
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3. Related Work
This paper is focused on the network communication protocol employed by
BTSync and the investigation thereof. The work presented as part of this paper
builds upon the work of Farina et al. [9], which outlines the forensic analysis
of the BTSync client application on a host machine. This paper outlines the
procedures for identifying a current or previous install of the BTSync application
and the extraction of secrets from gain physical access to a machines hard drive
and performing a regular digital forensic investigation on its image. At the time
of publication, there are no other academic publications focusing on BTSync.
However, seeing as BTSync shares a number of attributes and functionalities
with cloud synchronisation services, e.g., Dropbox, Google Drive, etc., and is
largely based on the BitTorrent protocol, this section outlines a number of
related case studies and investigative techniques for these technologies.
3.1. BitTorrent Forensics
Numerous investigations have been made into identifying the peer informa-
tion of those involved in BitTorrent swarms. Most of these publications focus
on the investigation of the unauthorised distributed of copyrighted material
[10], [11] and [12]. Depending on the focus of the investigation, peer informa-
tion may be recorded for a particular piece of material under investigation or a
larger landscape view of the peer activity across numerous pieces of content.
3.2. Client-side Synchronisation Tool Forensics
Forensics of cloud storage utilities can prove challenging, as presented by
Chung et al. in their 2012 paper [13]. The difficulty arises because, unless com-
plete local synchronisation has been performed, the data can be stored across
various distributed locations. For example, it may only reside in temporary local
files, volatile storage (such as the system’s RAM) or dispersed across multiple
datacentres of the service provider’s cloud storage facility. Any digital forensic
examination of these systems must pay particular attention to the method of
access, usually the Internet browser connecting to the service provider’s storage
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access page (https://www.dropbox.com/login for Dropbox for example). This
temporary access serves to highlight the importance of live forensic techniques
when investigating a suspect machine as a “pull out the plug” anti-forensic tech-
nique would not only lose access to any currently opened documents but may
also lose any currently stored sessions or other authentication tokens that are
stored in RAM.
In 2013, Martini and Choo published the results of a cloud storage forensics
investigation on the ownCloud service from both the perspective of the client
and the server elements of the service [14]. They found that artefacts were found
on both the client machine and on the server facilitating the identification of
files stored by different users. The module client application was found to store
authentication and file metadata relating to files stored on the device itself and
on files only stored on the server. Using the client artefacts, the authors were
able to decrypt the associated files stored on the server instance.
3.3. Extension of the Digital Evidence Acquisition Window
In 2014, Scanlon et al., outlined a case study on BTSync whereby the remote
recovery of evidence from a BTSync shared folder can enable the recovery of
evidence that is no longer accessible on the local machine [15]. This evidence
may have been securely deleted, corrupted or overwritten on the local device
or viewed (not stored) on a mobile device using the BitTorrent Sync app. The
paper outlines a number of entry points from the local machine into the inves-
tigation and the remote recovery of such evidence including local and network
sources.
4. BitTorrent Sync Network Protocol Analysis
Starting with the beta release of v1.4, BTSync changed its protocol to
more closely resemble that of the underlying BitTorrent protocol. In addition
to changes to the directory structure and the introduction of public/private
key storage for shares, the network traffic profile of the protocol changed dra-
matically by utilising the Micro Transmission Protocol (µTP ) as outlined in
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the BitTorrent Extension to Protocol (BEP) 29, which is officially specified
here: http://www.bittorrent.org/beps/bep_0029.html. This protocol was
already used by BitTorrent once actual file transfer was initiated but now BT-
Sync has adapted its communications to use µTP signalling resulting in a
smaller overall usage of bandwidth but a more noticeable footprint.
Where the initial release of BTSync used custom packets that all started with
the header BSYNC[00] or BSync[80], this purely cosmetic identifying header was
replaced with the µTP DATA version 1 (01) header for all request and transfer
packets and STATE (21) was used to perform the same functionality of the
original PING used to update peer availability and provide connection details
and data.
As with the original µTP protocol the connection management packets and
headers used by BTSync v1.4 and onwards are:
SYN : initiates the two-way µTP handshake to establish a connection with
the remote peer. This packet has its type indicator set to 4.
STATE : the most common packet in µTP , this “ACK” replaces the BTSync
response to PING and serves as both the keep-alive and the response to
the handshake initiation. This packet is identified by the type value of 2.
DATA : This packet is used to carry messages such as the peer request message
sent to the tracker or the peer list sent in response. This packet has a type
value of 0.
RST : as with TCP the RST packet is used to reset the connection in the event
of an error in transmission. This has a type identifier set to 3
FIN : Indicates the end of a connection and is denoted by the type value of 1.
The µTP message headers have a similar layout that is formatted as follows:
Header Type:[0/1/2/3/4]
Version:[1]
Extension[00]
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Figure 6: A newly created share will have some preferences set by default that can be toggled
by the user
ConnectionID:[AB CD]
Timestamp:[AB CD EF GH]
Timestamp Difference[AB CD EF GH]
Window Size:[AB CD EF GH]
sequence number:[AB CD]
Ack Number:[AB CD]
On provision of a new share several options are enabled automatically by
the application as shown in Figure 6. These options can be disabled or re-
enabled by the user at any time to customise the network behaviour of the local
repository being edited. These changes can also be managed through direct
editing of the application configuration files. The default behaviour for BTSync
is to utilise the tracker server at t.usyncapp.com. The DNS request resolves to
three IP addresses: 54.225.100.8, 54.225.92.50 and 54.225.196.38. These
three IP addresses are servers hosted on Amazon’s EC2 cloud service. This is
the BTSync tracker server, which facilitates peer discovery for clients looking
to synchronise data. One peer request message is sent for each share stored on
the local machine and the act of requesting a peer lookup also serves to register
the requesting client as a source for that share.
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Packets sent from the client to the tracker server contain registration details
and get_peers message requests (when a new share is created it registers the
share with the tracker using a get_peers packet). A get_peers packet takes
the form of:
Version 1.4:
Header type: 0
d2:la
6:[6 byte local IP:port]
2:lp[port integer]
1:m
9:get_peers
4:peer
20:[20 byte peer ID]
5:share
20:[20 byte ShareID]
e
Version 2.0:
Header type: 0
d2:la
6:[6 byte local IP:Port]
2:lp [local port integer]
1:m
9:get_peers
4:peer
20: [20 byte peer ID]
5:share
32:[32 byte ShareID]
e
(where the observed keys are defined in Table 2).
This packet is initially sent to the tracker server via TCP and UDP to
test connectivity. If both protocols succeed, UDP is the preferred method of
communication. Tracker updates are performed at a rate of once every 600
seconds or if a change is made to the share data, in which case the timer is
reset. A separate packet is sent for each share present on the local machine. It is
noteworthy that, even when a new share is created, the first packet advertising
that share to the server uses a message type of get_peers. Depending on
the bandwidth usage it is entirely possible for a single peer to simultaneously
contact and register with multiple tracker server addresses. Each share will have
its own Connection ID value in the µTP header for that get_peers packet and
each request will prompt a separate type 2 (ACK) response from the tracker
server followed by a separate response to the request itself.
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Table 2: Sample Tracker Packet
µTP The µTP data header that signifies
0x00 Null
d Start of the dictionary of key:value pairs
2:la Local address label identifier which consists of
6-bytes, the first 4 are IP, the last two are port
2:lp local port in integer form
1:m Message label identifier
9:get_peers message type value
4:peer Local peer label
20: Local PeerID
5:share Local ShareID label
20: The 20 character ShareID a transform of the se-
cret used and can be found in the .SyncID file.
32: A share ID based on some transform of the 20
byte ShareID, the local IP address and local
port.
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The receiving tracker will respond to the requesting client with the same
protocol used in the get_peers message. This has the consequence that if TCP
and UDP are successful on the first request, the first response will be a set of
duplicate TCP and UDP packet in the form:
Version 1.4 and 2.0:
Header type: 0
d2:ea
6:[requester external IP:port]
1:m
5:peers
5:peers
l[peer list starts]
e[peer list ends]
5:share
20:[20 byte ShareID]
4:time[timestamp]
e
Peer Entry in peer list
d
1:a[address key]
6:[external IP:Port value]
2:la[local address key]
6:[internal IP:Port]
1:p
20:[Peer ID]
e[end of Peer dictionary]
where the observed keys are defined in Table 2 The peer list returns an
entry for each peer currently in contact with the tracker through get_peer
requests. The current requesting peer will be included in this list so the peers
message will always have at least one entry in the peers list.
One unusual feature of the peers response is the inclusion of a peer’s local,
non-routable, IP address and Port. This is so that, if the local IP matches
the local subnet of the requesting peer, the requesting peer can attempt to
communicate directly over the LAN using the local address provided. If the
tracker server option is disabled then the local client will have to use a different
method to find peers local to it.
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Table 3: Multicast Ping Packet
BSYNC The BTSync Header
0x00 Null
d Start of the dictionary of key:value pairs
1:m Message label identifier
4:PING The message type
4:peer Local peer label
20: PeerID of the multicasting Peer
5:share Local ShareID label
32: The Share32 ID that matches that used in the
v2.0 get_peers
4.1. Local Peer Discovery
When the option to search LAN is enabled (the default behaviour) the ap-
plication will start sending out multicast packets to port 3838 across the LAN.
The multicast packets are BTSync bencoded packets with the following format
and the keys are further explained in Table 3.
BSYNC[00]
d1:m4:ping4:peer20:[20-byte Peer ID]
4:port[i Integer e]
5:share32:[32-byte content ShareID] e
The format of these packets has not changed since the original pre v1.4 BT-
Sync. Once LAN discovery is enabled the local neighbouring peers will respond
to the multicast broadcast with the “BSYNC[00]” TCP packet detailed below.
Once a peer receives a multicast message that contains a ShareID that it
possesses the peer responds with the content:
BSYNC[00]
d1:m4:ping4:peer20:[20-byte PeerID]
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4:port[i Integer e]
5:share20:[20-byte ShareID] e
The keys have the same definitions as those shown in Table 3 with the exception
of the ShareID being the more familiar 20 byte version.
Once the Ping has been sent the peers perform a BTSync session negotiation
involving the generation of a nonce value as laid out in Table 1. The rest of
the synchronisation takes place over TCP IP and the µTP traffic runs alongside
over UDP. The synchronisation process is signed off with a µTP Type 1 (FIN)
packet. After this there are regular µTP type 2 (STATE) messages to check for
changes.
4.2. BTSync Relay Server
When BTSync finds that it needs to communicate directly between two
firewalled peers, the application may make use of a relay server. The “Use
Relay Server if required” option is enabled by default on share creation. The
relay server is contacted by a DNS request sent out for r.usyncapp.com, which
resolves to the following IP addresses: 67.215.229.106 and 67.215.231.242.
These are the IP addresses of the relay servers contactable on remote port
3000. Each peer contacts the relay server using an outbound connection that
should bypass any firewall rule preventing unauthorised inbound connections.
Once the server handshake has taken place, the negotiation to set up a secure
connection between the two peers begins. The following sequence of events is
observable:
1. Peer contacts the relay server to initiate contact with the remote peer.
0022 | CounterA | BSYNC 0x000000 [20 byte remote peerID]
CounterB | peer20 | 20 byte local peerID
2. The relay server responds to the peer using a standard TCP ACK packet
3. The peer contacts the server to arrange transfer of the data and to supply
the nonce for encrypted traffic and provide a status ID.
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0066 | CounterA | BSYNC 0x00(4) :d5:nonce16:[nonce value for key
share]5:share20:[20 byte shareID]e
4. The relay contacts the peer to initiate the session counters
0022 | CounterA | [20 byte remote peerID]
remote Peer IP:Port | Counter B
5. The relay server Confirms the SID status and supplies the remote nonce
to complete the bridge for encrypted data transfer
0022 | CounterB | remote peerID | 0066 | remote Peer ID | CounterA
BSYNC 00x4 | :d5:Nonce16:[nonce value]5:share20:[20 byte ShareID]e
6. The Relay server contacts the local peer to deliver the remote public key
7. the local peer delivers its public key to the relay server
8. Encrypted bidirectional traffic transfer commences with the relay server
acting as the router delivering packets to each peer.
4.3. BTSync Data Transfer
The transfer of data during a BTSync synchronisation operates in a similar
fashion as a regular BitTorrent download as described in Section 2.1.3 above.
A unique magnet URI is created for each file contained within the shared folder
and this is used for requesting chunks of the entire file from known peers sharing
this content.
4.4. Differentiation from Regular BitTorrent Traffic
While much of the network topology of BTSync is shared with regular Bit-
Torrent, the request and response packets differ from those employed by regular
BitTorrent file-sharing traffic. The most obvious addition is the BSYNC header
attached to each datagram transmitted on the network. In addition, the intro-
duction of µTP causes increased volume of traffic recognisable even though µTP
results in lower overall bandwidth usage. Besides that addition, the active peer
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list that is returned also contains additional information over the regular Bit-
Torrent file-sharing protocol: namely the inclusion of the local IP:port address
pairs for each peer. From an investigative perspective, this extra information
could prove useful in identifying the particular machine involved in the BTSync
network as opposed to merely resolving the WAN IP address back to a router
with potentially hundreds of LAN users. The local DHCP records could be used
to resolve the MAC address (and often the hostname) of the individual machine
identified during the network investigation.
In addition to the regular BitTorrent peer discovery methods outline in Sec-
tion 2.1.2 above, BTSync also allows the user to manually add known IP ad-
dresses to the local cache of peers. BTSync facilitates this through the option
to add “Predefined Hosts” to the configuration or application options. These
are hardcoded IP address and port entries that are saved in order of prefer-
ence. BTSync will contact these peers directly, without any requirement for a
multicast (LPD) or sending a get_peers request to an online tracker.
5. Investigation Methodology
This section outlines a reproducible methodology for the network investi-
gation methodology. Depending on which of the scenarios outlined above, the
methodology may branch according to what the desired outcome will be. Fig-
ure 7 outlines the five steps involved in the investigative process (each of these
steps are described in greater detail below).
5.1. Identification of Content
Depending on the scenario that motivates the BTSync network investigation,
there are a number of avenues that the forensic investigator may find secrets
(and corresponding hash values) needed for investigation:
5.1.1. Web Discovery
– As soon as BTSync was released as a public alpha, publicly accessible shar-
ing secrets started to appear online. Two “subreddits” appeared on Reddit [16]
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Figure 7: Steps Involved in Performing a BTSync Network Investigation
and numerous websites and blogs were created to set up an online “dead drop” se-
cret share, for example http://www.12char.com and http://www.btsynckeys.com.
It is also feasible that an investigator could come across an online community
that shares secrets in a private forum for the purposes of trading data and ma-
terial without 3rd party involvement. Keys to shares discovered in this manner
that possess a timestamp component will need to be checked to determine if the
link has expired or not.
5.1.2. Local Discovery
– An investigator could, in the course of an investigation find evidence of
BTSync having been used to transfer material to the suspect machine. This
could be that BTSync installed and the folder listed in the list of shares stored
in the configuration file, webUI or the BTSync hidden .Sync folder. BTSync
log files (/.sync/sync.log), or, if BTSync is not present (uninstalled) there could
still be .SyncID files remaining in folders that were synchronised from remote
peers. A hexdump of the .SyncID file or, more conveniently, the names of the
*.db files found in the .Sync folder will give the SHA1 encoded share ID that
the investigator needs to find other peers actively sharing that content
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5.1.3. LAN traffic
– Many companies configure their edge firewalls to block torrent traffic for
the general users. If the company uses torrent for some other business purpose
it will usually be accounted for and allowed from or to a particular server or
subnet. However, BTSync allows for all external communicate beyond the LAN
to be turned off (in the configuration file or in the settings dialogue the options
for “Use DHT”, “Use Tracker” and “Use Relay Server” can be disabled) leaving
only the settings for LAN discovery or known peers. A security review of the
router logs may find active torrent traffic within the LAN or system admins
may discover evidence of torrent applications run.
5.2. Identification of Lookup Hash
Requesting a list of peers through any of the peer discovery methods outlined
above requires a unique lookup hash. This hash is used by the tracker, DHT,
PEX and LPD in the association of know peers to a particular piece of content.
5.3. Crawl the Network to Identify Peer Information
Each of the peer discovery methods outlined above should be queried for a
list of known active nodes sharing that content. Due to the user configurable
nature over which services are enabled in the BTSync client, to ensure complete
node enumeration/identification, the results from each of the peer discovery
methods should be combined to form the final result of collected information.
5.4. Downloading and Verification of Content
Depending on the scenario being investigated, it may be necessary to down-
load a copy of the content stored remotely for investigation or verification. In
order to accomplish this, a regular BitTorrent download can be started for each
of the files contained within the shared folder. If the investigation’s goal is
to attempt to recreate content deliberately deleted off a suspect’s machine, the
data can only be entirely recovered if there is a complete copy of the data stored
remotely. However, this does not mean that any single node needs to have 100%
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of the content. The original data can be recombined so long as a complete copy
exists split among the distributed nodes actively sharing the content. An obsta-
cle to this stage of the investigation would be the use of limited use keys. The
link descriptor for a key has no component to indicate a restricted number of
uses. A further obstacle would be the option to require authorisation before a
peer can access a share. This is unlikely to be the case for links discovered on
a public platform.
6. Proof of Concept
In order to begin proof of concept testing for the investigation methodology,
a bespoke BTSync crawling application was first designed and developed. This
application was built to emulate regular BTSync client usage, as outlined above,
and recorded the necessary results for analysis.
6.1. Overview
To demonstrate the functionality of the application, an investigation was
conducted on a known publicly accessible BTSync secret. One of the public BT-
Sync online secret sharing sites was used (http://www.btsynckeys.com/) to ac-
quire a secret likely to have active peers sharing the corresponding content. The
secret selected was advertised with the description “45 GB Movie Collection
[Movies] [R]” and the read-only secret BKV273YUFMWILMESLRDVLI5NHMWO3OCS7
was supplied. It is important to note that there is no certainty that the descrip-
tion accurately advertises the content within the share. There is no method of
verifying any of the containing shared content until the syncing process begins
and temporary files are created in the shared folder. Even at that point, the user
can merely see the file names of the content once the download/synchronisation
process has begun.
6.2. Results
As part of the peer identification process a number of active peers were
returned to the investigative application. These peers were recorded for later
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Figure 8: Daily Snapshot Comparison for Investigated Secret (Public IP Addresses Partially
Redacted)
analysis. During the first snapshot taken for this investigation, 21 peers were
identified as sharing the specific content and 20 were identified on the second.
A snapshot accounts for all of the peers identified sharing the specific content
at the same instance in time.
Two peers (differentiated by PeerID) of particular interest are listed as the
second and third last peers in both tables in Figure 8 (highlighted in red).
Comparing their peer ID and local IP:Port address pairing, it is clear that these
two peers are referring to the same individual node. Between the two snapshots
taken of this shared content, their IP address changed from one IP address range
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to another. However, both of these IP address ranges are associated with the ISP
“Telefonica” in the same postal zip code in Berlin, Germany (data gathered from
Maxmind [17]). This information indicates an ISP level IP address reallocation
sometime between the two snapshots as opposed to the use of a VPN or other IP
address masking system. The two peers share the same external IP address but
have different external ports and local IP:port pairs indicating that the BTSync
install on these nodes are accessing the Internet through a router employing
Network Address Translation (NAT).
6.3. Churn Rate
While the example investigation outlined as part of this paper focuses on a
single secret over a 24 hour window, the low churn rate of just 7% remains inter-
esting. Most P2P networks experience a high turnover of peers [18]; following
the assumption that most users are active on the network while downloading
some content and disconnect upon completion. BTSync is designed to be a tool
that functions in a similar manner to cloud file synchronisation services like
Dropbox or Google Drive. These tools largely operate on an “install and forget”
approach whereby synchronisation and updating between the cloud and poten-
tially multiple client machines does not require any direct user input. BTSync
uses a similar approach and as a result, low churn rates would be expected.
6.4. Geolocation
Figure 9 shows the geographic distribution of the peers identified as part of
the investigation. While the total number of peers identified with this proof
of concept investigation is quite low, the data remains consistent with regular
BitTorrent investigative results [11] with North America and Europe being the
most popular continents involved.
7. Example Investigation
In late August 2014, the iCloud accounts of numerous celebrities were hacked
and compromising photos and videos were posted online without their con-
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Figure 9: Geolocation of Discovered IP Addresses
sent in what has gained notoriety in the media and among Internet users as
"The Fappening" [19] or "Celebgate" [20]. The comprised photos spread across
the globe with the help of Internet forums, such as htpp://4chan.org and
http://reddit.com. At the time, there was concerns that iCloud itself had
been hacked and these leaks were merely a subset of the information stolen of
Apple’s servers, however an investigation into the attack found that the pass-
words were cracked for specific accounts [19].
7.1. Entry Point
The entry point to this investigation first involved verifying that this con-
tent was being shared using BTSync. On the public BTSync secret sharing
“subreddit” http://reddit.com/r/btsecrets, a number of public read-only
secrets were shared containing collections of the leaked content. For the pur-
poses of this investigation, one shared leaked content was investigated using the
aforementioned BTSync investigative application. The secret investigated was
bb63eb5b61969956e71273026f00a1deca464413. The investigation took place
one week after the leak occurred.
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Figure 10: Network-based Entry Point into Investigation (ShareID Highlighted in Blue
A BTSync dissector for Wireshark was developed1 to expedite the network
analysis process. This dissector can identify the various packets pertinent to
the decentralised service in the Wireshark traffic capture, as can be seen in Fig-
ure 10. Using the gathered ShareID from the network traffic, the investigative
application was launched and the ShareID supplied.
7.2. Peer Discovery
Figure 11: IP Addresses Discovered Sharing the Content
1Wireshark Dissector is downloadable from http://www.markscanlon.co/bittorrent-sync
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Using the gathered ShareID, the application was able to gather information
about each of the peers sharing the content, as can be seen in Figure 11 using
each of the peer discovery methods outlined above.
7.3. Geolocation
Figure 12: Geolocation of Discovered Peers
The IP addresses detected during the investigation were geolocated and
found to be located in North America and Europe, as can be seen in Figure 12.
7.4. Data Recoverable from Remote Peers
Figure 13: Evidence Recovery from Remote Peers
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Some of the evidence recoverable from remote peers in this particular BT-
Sync share can be seen in Figure 13. The version of the BTSync available at
the time of the investigation (v1.4), did not have selective sync functionality.
As a result, each member of the secret must download all of the shared content.
This limitation of a lack of selective syncing means that each peer identified
will eventually have all of the content in the share. This feature makes evidence
recovery from such popular shares more performant for digital investigators as
each node is a potential source of the pertinent evidence. With the advent of
v2.0 of the application, selective sync means that each peer must be commu-
nicated with individually to identify which active machines identified has what
data.
8. Conclusion
This paper documented the protocol used in BitTorrent Sync during the
discovery of peers and the synchronisation of data. While BTSync is not neces-
sarily intended to replace BitTorrent as a file dissemination utility, it will likely
be used for this purpose. This is already facilitated though websites providing
shared secrets, e.g., Reddit [16], etc., as a form of dead-drop. The develop-
ers describe the tool as an end-to-end encrypted method of transferring files
without the use of a third party staging area, which ensures that the content
and personal details remain hidden from unauthorised access. Analysis of the
network communication procedure produced unique identifiable information on
peers including their unique PeerID, their external and local IP addresses and
port numbers. In combination with traditional digital forensic methods, once a
secret is identified, it is possible to discover other nodes on the network who are
also sharing this data. Deleted data from a local shared folder could be down-
loaded from the network and recombined for forensic investigation. From an
investigative perspective, the decentralised nature of BTSync will always leave
an avenue of gathering information and identifying nodes sharing particular
content open to the forensic investigator.
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